Friday, May 17, 2013
Thursday, May 16, 2013
Iraq’s Troubled Agricultural Sector
In May 2013 Deputy Agricultural
Minister Ghazi Obeidi told the press that Iraq’s farm sector was booming. He claimed that the country would soon be meeting domestic demand for fruits,
vegetables, and wheat. Obeidi went on to state that was due to the Agricultural
Ministry’s policies, which include the banning of certain imports, and
providing new crops to help Iraqi farmers. Agriculture is one of the most
important industries after oil and gas. It is the second largest employer, and
one-third of the population lives in rural areas. Currently the countryside is
suffering from high rates of poverty and food insecurity, which has led to a
mass migration to Iraq’s cities. After decades of neglect due to sanctions and
wars, agriculture could be one field that with proper development could provide
much needed jobs to Iraqis, and stabilize farming regions. Unfortunately, there
are major structural barriers to achieving these goals, despite the deputy
minister’s pronouncement.
Farmers like this one in Basra face a
number of structural and environmental barriers to succeeding (Reuters)
Farming in Iraq has suffered some
hard times over the last few decades. It accounted for 23.5% of jobs in 2008,
but only contributed 3.9% of GDP. Those figures have been going down as the
Agricultural Ministry reported a drop in the number of farmers and areas underproduction in recent years. As a result, Iraq’s agricultural yields are
50-75% lower than its neighbors, and that difference has increased in the last
ten years. The United States Agency for International Development reported that
crop production in Iraq went up from 2001 to 2002, and then fluctuated before hitting
a steady decline after 2005. Using 1999-2001 as a baseline, the country’s
output was up 6% in 2005, and then went down by 17% by 2009. That compared to
the rest of the Middle East and North Africa that saw a steady increase during
the 2000s going from up 1% in 2001 to up 25% by 2009. After the end of
sanctions in 2003, Iraq’s agricultural sector should have been freed of
restrictions, and had a renaissance. Instead, government and environmental
factors have led to its decline.
Crop
Production Index (1999-2001=100)
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
|
Iraq
|
108.0
|
129.0
|
103.0
|
101.0
|
106.0
|
105.0
|
100.0
|
81.0
|
83.0
|
MENA
|
101.1
|
109.5
|
115.2
|
117.7
|
120.6
|
126.7
|
122.7
|
116.2
|
125.2
|
Lower
Middle
Income Countries
|
102.9
|
104.7
|
108.8
|
113.8
|
117.4
|
120.8
|
124.4
|
129.5
|
128.0
|
World
|
101.7
|
101.9
|
105.1
|
111.9
|
113.4
|
114.6
|
117.9
|
122.5
|
122.2
|
Rural areas of Iraq are suffering.
39% of the countryside is poor compared to 16% in urban areas. That is a direct
reflection of the sorry state of farming, which provides the main livelihood
for rural families. The country has been flooded from cheap food imports from
neighboring countries like Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria, which Iraqi
producers cannot compete with. In 2012, the country bought 50-80% of its
vegetables from abroad. One major reason is that the United States removed many
tariffs immediately after the 2003 invasion. Another is that Iraqis are using
30 year old farm techniques due to sanctions, and the lingering affects of past
wars that isolated them from modern improvements like the use of sprinklers and
drip irrigation to new seeds to new equipment. That underdevelopment means that
there is huge potential for growth in the industry. Baghdad has talked about
jump starting the farm sector to provide jobs and development in rural areas
for years, but these policies have largely failed.
The Iraqi government has tried a
number of different tactics to help agriculture, but they have not worked. One
problem is that not enough money has been budgeted for the Agricultural
Ministry. In 2010 it received $1.4 billion for investment, which was below the
mark set in the 5-year national development plan. Even with that money, the
Ministry’s policies were ill advised. In 2008 it attempted to double the prices
it paid to farmers in an effort to boost production. In 2009 and 2011, the
government tried banning the import of vegetables and fruits, and in the former
year it tried to impose a tariff to raise the cost on cheap foreign farm
products. This year, it announced that it would increase the purchase of wheat,
barley, and corn to help out farmers, provide them with loans, and assist with
new irrigation equipment. So far, none of those policies have worked. The
2009 tariff for instance, was never enforced, and the import bans caused huge
price increases, because domestic farmers could not meet demand. Iraq’s water
supply system is also inefficient and fragmented. There are three different
delivery systems, one in Kurdistan, one run by the central government to the
provinces, and one for Baghdad. None of them are coordinated. There are no
meters on the system, so there is no way for the authorities to collect fees on
users, which means there’s no check on usage. Finally, the government restricts
the use of new seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs, all of which are under
state control. It takes up to two years to register new seed varieties, and can
cost anywhere from $2,000-$3,700, a huge sum for the average Iraqi. The
Agricultural Ministry, and others control state-run enterprises that make
fertilizer, farming chemicals, and other agricultural products. Those plants
are not productive, which cause constant shortages, and the publicly produced
fertilizer and other inputs are given to middlemen free of charge who then sell
them at very high rates to farmers. All together these are huge hurdles for any
rural family to overcome. The state’s policies have often backfired, and hurt
farmers. On top of that, the government mismanages the production and
distribution of products necessary for their work. All together the authorities
have been a hindrance rather than a benefit to the agriculture sector.
An additional issue is the food
ration system. Started during the 1990s sanctions, the state-run food
distribution system is the largest in the world, and a major impediment to
the growth of farming. The rations require huge imports of products that could
be produced domestically. In 2012 for instance, Iraq bought 5.4 tons of foreign food products for the system. Those subsidized imports lower prices by an
estimated 20%, and undercut domestic farmers. According to the United Nations,
Iraqis are less dependent upon the ration system than before, with the
exceptions of wheat and rice. In November 2012, when the cabinet proposed ending the rations, and replacing it with cash payments it reversed itself in five days due to political pressure, namely concerns about how the change
would play out during the 2013 provincial elections. Not only that, but the
system is highly inefficient and corrupt, yet there’s no political will to
modify or end it once again undermining farmers.
Regional and environmental factors
also impede the development of the agricultural industry. The land of two
rivers is getting less and less water from those two giants the Euphrates and
the Tigris. Only 3% of the Euphrates and 32% of the Tigris originate in Iraq.
In contrast, 68% of the Tigris comes from Turkey and Iran. That means those two
upstream countries along with Syria control much of Iraq’s water, and they have
been building dams and diverting the water for their own uses cutting Iraq’s
supply since the 1990s. There is no cooperation with Iran, Turkey, and Syria
over water policy, which means the problem is going to get worse. Within Iraq,
demand has gone up, and there have been successive droughts over the last few
years. That has meant the country has gone from water secure to water stressed,
and the U.N. has warned that it could become water scarce by 2025. Finally,
southern Iraq is suffering from high levels of soil salinity. Up to 50% of the
cultivated land has salt issues, and the farming techniques used have made it worse.
Baghdad has consistently called for talks with its neighbors over the Tigris
and Euphrates, but that has gone nowhere, and the other nations don’t seem
interested to begin with. Because Iraq is so behind in its farming methods the
salinity issue is also going to get worse. Finally, the droughts are natural
disasters, which the government has found no solutions to, because it is so
inefficient, and lacks the planning to deal with such issues.
Iraq needs a sound government policy
if it hopes to save its declining farming sector. A strategic plan needs to be
put into place that involves modernizing the industry, loosening state control
over inputs, while strengthening limits on water usage, reforming the food
ration system, dealing with the cheap imports, and seriously addressing the
problems it has with its neighbors. Baghdad has done little of this. Instead it
has followed a haphazard approach that is uncoordinated, and often hurts those
that it is trying to help. Sometimes it doesn’t even follow its own policies
like with the tariff on foreign farm goods. The root cause of these problems is
the lack of political will to make any meaningful changes, and a lack of effective
planning. That is resulting in the continued decline in agriculture, and the
migration of farmers to the cities. That is having a ripple affect upon society
by increasing the housing shortage. This is a shame since farming could be a
major source of jobs, and a way to diversify the economy away from its
dependence upon oil. Farmers simply don’t have the means to overcome all these
structural and environmental factors on their own, and until the government gets
its act together, and gives this topic the attention it deserves the rural
areas of Iraq will continue to suffer.
SOURCES
Adel, Shaymaa, “Iraq imported more
than 5 million tons of food last year,” Azzaman, 3/29/13
Al-Aukaili, Khawla, “Iraqi
agricultural sector booming, says deputy minister,” Azzaman, 5/14/13
Decamme, Guillaume, “Iraq ration card reform sparks anger,”
Agence France Presse, 11/12/12
IRIN, “Less dependent on food rations,” 5/7/13
Kadhem, Adel, “Iraq’s wheat harvest exceeded 3 million tons
in 2012,” Azzaman, 2/15/13
Shafaq News, “6,500 acres of Diyala’s farms and orchards
threatened by drought,” 3/23/13
Al-Shaher, Omar, “Iraqi Agriculture in Crisis,” Al-Monitor,
1/29/13
Al-Taie, Khalid, “Iraq aims to support local farmers through
new proposal,” Al-Shorfa, 4/12/13
Tijara Provincial Economic Growth
Program, “Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priority In Iraq,”
United States Agency for International Development, 10/4/12
Al-Ukaili, Khawla, “Iraq raises
prices of locally produced grains,” Azzaman, 4/17/13
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Why Anbar’s Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman Joined Iraq’s Protest Movement
Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman is one of the leaders of the
Dulaim tribe, one of the largest in western Iraq that stretches into
neighboring Jordan. Sulaiman has attached himself to the protest movement in
Anbar, and has become known for his inflammatory speeches. It wasn’t that long
ago however, that the sheikh was an ally of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His
path that led him from a supporter to an opponent of the government is due to
Sulaiman’s opportunism, and desire to become a prominent sheikh throughout Iraq
like his grandfather once was.
Sheikh Sulaiman has been trying to return to his family’s
once prominent position in Anbar (Los Angeles Times)
Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman has joined the Anbar protest
movement in his latest attempt to gain power. Sulaiman has worked his way into the
demonstrators by befriending their spokesman Said al-Lafi. The sheikh has
been known to give outrageous speeches in the city, often threatening violence.
As a result, he was removed from the electoral list for the 2013 provincial
vote, which has been delayed in Anbar. In January, Sulaiman started off by
simply repeating some of the main demands of the movement such as releasing female
prisoners. By March, he was accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of working for Iran. In April, he said that tribes in Anbar should arm
themselves, warned that the security forces should not leave their barracks, because people wanted their blood after the government raid upon the demonstrators in Hawija. Then in May he demanded that Maliki be replaced,
and said that the Pride and Dignity Army was ready to defend the protesters if
the authorities attacked them. Sulaiman has embraced the Ramadi movement,
and given these types of speeches in order to raise his profile in Anbar. That
city’s protests have been more moderate than in others, some of which are
connected to the insurgency. In order to make himself stand out, he has turned
to more virulent accusations against Baghdad, and made reference to taking up
the gun. That was a turn for Sulaiman who was once aligned with the prime
minister.
Before, Sheikh Sulaiman’s plans involved attaching himself
to the Americans, and then the Maliki government. Sulaiman was one of the founders of the Anbar Awakening Council that involved tribal fighters that turned
against Al Qaeda in Iraq in the province. In 2008, he formed a Tribal Support Council in the governorate as part of Prime Minister Maliki’s strategy
to build up support amongst sheikhs. By 2010, he joined the premier’s State of Law list for that year’s parliamentary elections. At the time, Maliki
was looking for Sunni allies to expand his base outside of his traditional
Shiite followers. That was a decision that was not going to win the sheikh many
supporters, especially when the prime minister backed the banning of candidates
before the vote for being former Baathists. That marriage of convenience didn’t
last as Sulaiman quickly quit the alliance after the balloting. The next year,
he joined the call to make Anbar a region in response to a wave of arrests of
alleged Baathists by Maliki. By the end of 2011, he had his house in
Baghdad raided, and some of his guards were arrested for ties to the former regime. He blamed Maliki, and accused the premier of using the security forces for his own political ends. All of these moves were aimed at
gaining notoriety and power. Allying with the Americans through the Awakening
movement opened up a new source of money and weapons, and rode the wave of
Sunnis turning on the insurgency. Then working with Baghdad added Sulaiman to
Maliki’s patronage network through first the Tribal Councils, and then as part
of the prime minister’s party. That paid little dividends in Anbar however as
the prime minister had few supporters there. That led Sulaiman to break with
Maliki, and become a critic. The sheikh therefore has been characterized by key
strategic moves along with a healthy dose of opportunism in his attempt to
restore his family’s standing.
Since 2003, Sheikh Sulaiman has tried to pick winners in the
ever-changing sea of Iraqi politics, and ride that wave until another force
emerges. That explains why he went from being a supporter of Prime Minister
Maliki to an opponent. His tactics have brought him wealth and a good share of
notoriety, but probably not as much as he would like. Other Anbar sheikhs such
as Ahmed Abu Risha have had much more success, which likely bothers Sulaiman to
no end. That’s because Sulaiman would like to have the same status and power of
not only them, but of his grandfather who was one of the leading tribal leaders in Iraq during the late Ottoman and British mandate period. It’s this
memory that is a driving force for the sheikh. That’s probably why Sulaiman has
emerged as a firebrand speaker at the Ramadi protests. How else might the
former try to adhere himself to the masses other than making himself stand out
with addresses aimed at attacking the prime minister’s rule, and threatening
violence if the government doesn’t change? Whenever the protests end, the sheikh
will have to find another cause in an attempt to become an influential leader
not only in Anbar, but nationally as well as Sulaiman aspires to.
SOURCES
Ali, Fadhil, “Sunni Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten
Iraq’s Security,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/11/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Anbar Sahwa member says council won’t
participate in new govt.,” 5/19/08
- “New political entity formed in Anbar province,” 2/18/12
BBC, “Protests engulf west Iraq as Anbar rises against
Maliki,” 1/2/13
Dagher,
Sam, “Rift threatens U.S. antidote to Al Qaeda in Iraq,” Christian Science
Monitor, 2/13/08
Fayad,
Ma’ad, “Al-Anbar Salvation Council to Run in Parliamentary Elections,” Asharq
Al-Awsat, 9/21/08
- “National Front for Salvation of Iraq Leader Vows to Fight
Islamic Party,” Asharq Alawsat, 9/26/08
Ibrahim, Haider, “Security forces storm house of Sunni
tribal leader,” AK News, 11/1/11
Institute for the Study of War,
“2013 Iraq Update $17: Iraq’s Sunni Mobilize,” 4/27/13
Montgomery, Colonel Gary and McWilliams, Chief Warrant
Officer Timothy, editors, Al-Anbar
Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in
Iraq, 2004-2009, Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009
National Iraqi News Agency, “Amir
of Dulaim clans accuse al-Maliki to push Iraq into division,” 5/12/13
- “Emir of Dulaim states that
protestors’ main demand now is to topple Maliki’s Government,” 4/23/13
- “Emir of Dulaim Tribes: Maliki postponed elections in
Anbar in fear of a new strong Council demands the province’s rights,” 3/19/13
Ottaway, Marina, Kaysi, Danial Anas, “Iraq: Coalition Under
Stress,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6/8/11
Parker, Ned, “Anger is growing among Iraq’s Sunnis,” Los
Angeles Times, 2/13/13
- “Iraq’s Nouri Maliki may gain power with U.S. security
agreement,” Los Angeles Times, 11/24/08
Roads To Iraq, “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and
The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09
- “Iraq pre-election political map – The Sunni scene,”
9/19/09
Sadah, Ali Abel, “Sunni Iraqi Leaders Accused Of Supporting
Terrorism,” Al-Monitor, 3/11/13
- “Truce Proposal Splits Sunni Protesters in Iraq,”
Al-Monitor, 5/8/13
Saeed, Samer Elias, “Inside Iraq:
Sunni tribes call for arms,” Azzaman, 4/26/13
Shachtman,
Noah, “Iraq’s Tribal Rebellion Eating Itself?” Danger Room, Wired, 2/13/08
Al-Shammari, Yazn, “Tribal leader calls for demonstration in
protest against “arbitrary detentions,”” AK News, 11/1/11
Sly, Liz, “IRAQ: Mutterings of tribal revolt,” Babylon &
Beyond, Los Angeles Times, 4/28/09
Visser, Reidar, “Why an Allawi-Hakim Alliance would Mean
Retrogression in Iraq,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/21/09
Wicken, Stephen, “2013 Iraq Update #10a: Maliki Pursues
Issawi – Again,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/13/13
Tuesday, May 14, 2013
Behind Iraq’s Impressive GDP Growth Rate
Iraq’s economy is noteworthy for its contradictions. Many
experts believe that it will be one of the fastest growing economies in the
world over the next few years. That’s mostly because of its tremendous oil and
natural gas wealth that fuels the entire nation. On the other hand,
unemployment, underemployment, and poverty are relatively high. The Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is a perfect example of a figure that appears to show
the promise of the country, but upon further inspection shows the large structural
problems within Iraq.
Iraq’s economy is expected to expand tremendously over the
next few years. The Central Bank of Iraq thinks that the GDP will grow 9.4% from 2012-2016. That would be up from 5-6% growth in 2011. The World Bank
said that the GDP would grow 12.6% in 2012, and 10.2% in 2013, while the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted 11.1% in 2012, and 13.5% in 2013. The Central Bank stated that it thought the GDP would go from approximately
$170 billion in 2011 to $360 billion by 2015. All of this is due to the
expected development of the oil and gas industry. It contributes 59% of GDP, and 63% of real GDP. Foreign energy companies working to boost production
and exports, new infrastructure slowly coming on line, and continued high
prices for Iraqi crude are the major reasons why the Central Bank, the World
Bank, and the IMF all have rosy views of Iraq’s economy. The country also needs
massive investment in nearly everything after years of wars and sanctions. That
adds further avenues for the expansion of the economy.
Since 2003, the GDP has steadily gone up with only one small
dip. In 2002, before the U.S. invasion, GDP stood at $20.5 billion. It then
dropped to $13.6 billion, because of the war, but then quickly recovered to
$25.8 billion in 2004, $31.4 billion in 2005, $45.1 billion in 2006, $57.0
billion in 2007, $86.6 billion in 2008, then declining to $65.2 billion in 2009
because of the world recession, before rebounding to $82.2 billion in 2010. All
of this growth was based upon the oil industry. As exports increased, so did
the GDP. When exports jumped from an average of 790,000 barrels a day in 2003
for instance, to 1.47 million in 2004, the GDP went up +46.5%. Likewise, when
there was only marginal expansion of exports such as from 2006 to 2007, there
was a slow down in GDP growth going from +5.9% to +4.1% respectively.
Year
|
GDP
|
Per Capita
GDP
|
Real GDP
Change
|
Oil
Exports
(Mil/Bar/Day)
|
2002
|
$20.5 bil
|
$802
|
-7.8%
|
1.3
|
2003
|
$13.6 bil
|
$518
|
-41.4%
|
0.79
|
2004
|
$25.8 bil
|
$951
|
+46.5%
|
1.47
|
2005
|
$31.4 bil
|
$1,124
|
+3.7%
|
1.36
|
2006
|
$45.1 bil
|
$1,568
|
+5.9%
|
1.50
|
2007
|
$57.0 bil
|
$1,926
|
+4.1%
|
1.66
|
2008
|
$86.6 bil
|
$2,845
|
+9.5%
|
1.84
|
2009
|
$65.2 bil
|
$2,087
|
+4.2%
|
1.90
|
2010
|
$82.2 bil
|
$2,564
|
+0.8%
|
1.89
|
2011
|
$170 bil est.
|
$5,342 est.
|
+5.6% est.
|
2.16
|
2012
|
$128.1 bil est.
|
$3,808
est.
|
+12.6%
est.
|
2.41
|
The aggregate numbers for Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product hide
the large inequalities within the country. First, oil and gas are
capital-intensive industries that provide little employment for Iraqis. Only 1%
of the workforce is employed in the energy sector. Instead, oil revenues are
distributed throughout society through the government. In 2012, it was one of
the largest public employers in the world providing 60% of full time work. That
percentage was higher in the Kurdistan Regional Government. As oil has
expanded, so has the number of government workers going from 28% in 2005 to 43%
in 2008 of the entire workforce. The vast majority of these workers do little
to no real work. For example, former Planning Minister Ali Baban said in 2010
that 70% of public employees were unproductive. In comparison, agriculture and manufacturing have declined since 2003 due to the repeal of tariffs by the
Coalition Provisional Authority, the lack of reliable electricity, and the
inability to compete with foreign products, which are heavily subsidized, such
as Western wheat and barely. Even with that huge expansion, unemployment is still officially at 11%. Not only that, but those families that do not have
a relative in the government are more likely to fall into poverty, because
they lack a steady income and pensions. It is one reason why the government
poverty rate is still high at 17%. That doesn’t mean private employment hasn’t
grown in recent years, but again, that’s largely due to outsourcing by the
government. That too has problems as many employers look towards foreign
workers, because of their cheap wages, and to make up for the loss of domestic
professionals due to a massive brain drain that has happened since the 1990s.
Finally, the government is not helping the situation. It is pushing the oil
industry as the means to expand the economy, and despite its many promises to
diversify and privatize, it is enlarging the state sector instead. These many
problems are what the GDP numbers do not reveal. Yes, the figures for Iraq’s
economy are going up dramatically, but that does not mean that they are
actually helping the majority of the population. If the end result of Baghdad’s
policy is the hope for families to have a relative in the public sector who
does little actual work that does not make a productive society.
Iraq’s GDP is just one example of where the numbers do not
reflect the full reality of what is going on in the country. The expansion of
the oil and gas industry with the help of foreign energy companies is driving
economic growth. That is benefiting the entire population, but not as much as
the figures would have one believe. Money is trickling down, but through the
inefficient government with public sector jobs and contracts for private
companies. This has given rise to increasing wages, but the vast majority of
government workers do nothing, and Baghdad is using its oil revenue to expand
the state rather than diversify the economy, which would do a much better job
of raising the standard of living for all Iraqis. Until these structural
problems are addressed, Iraq will have a fast growing economy, while still
dealing with massive disparities.
SOURCES
Adel, Shaymaa, “Iraq reports
plunge in poverty and unemployment levels,” Azzaman, 5/5/13
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A
Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/4/09
Dunia Frontier Consultants, “2011 Year in Review, Foreign Commercial
Activity In Iraq,” March 2012
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour
Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,”
Brookings Institution, July 2012
Peel, Michael, “Iraq faces uphill battle to rebuild,”
Financial Times, 5/9/12
Reuters, “Iraq sees at least 9.4 percent GDP growth to 2016:
central bank,” 2/19/12
Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program, “Assessment of
Current and Anticipated Economic Priority In Iraq,” United States Agency for
International Development, 10/4/12
Yousif, Bassam, “Aspiration and Reality in Iraq’s
Post-Sanctions Economy,” Middle East Repot, Spring 2013
- “The economy of Iraq since 2003-a follow-up,” Indiana
State University Economics Department, August 2012
Monday, May 13, 2013
Kurdish Alliance Agrees To Face Saving Agreement With Iraq’s Central Government To Return To Baghdad
Since March 2013, the Kurdish Coalition had been boycotting
the central government. This was the result of on-going disputes over the 2013
budget, and the country’s oil policy. Recently the two sides came to a new
agreement that allowed the Kurdish ministers and lawmakers to return to
Baghdad. The deal was roundly criticized, because it gained no immediate
benefits for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The reason why the
Kurdish list agreed to return to office with none of its demands met was that it
was gaining nothing from its absence, and simply wanted a face saving device to
end its boycott.
New Baghdad-Irbil agreement was announced after PMs Barzani
and Maliki met (pmo.iq)
In May 2013, Kurdistan announced that it had come to a new
deal with Baghdad. This came after several delegations from the two sides met
including one from the National Alliance in April that went to the KRG, followed by Kurdish Premier Nechirvan Barzani meeting with members of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law in Iran, which allegedly played a
mediating role, and then a meeting between the two premiers in Baghdad. That
resulted in a seven-point agreement that included drafting a bill to compensate
victims of Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign, the creation of a joint security
committee between Irbil and Baghdad, another committee to deal with security in
the disputed areas that includes the Tigris Operations Command, following
through with the draft law made by President Jalal Talabani that would redraw
the country’s provincial borders, create a third committee to look into
judicial, custom, travel, and border crossing issues, amend the 2013 budget,
and work on passing the hydrocarbon legislation. These are all
long-standing disputes that Kurdistan has had with the central government.
Maliki has recently been pushing on several of these fronts as well to gain
support of Sunnis over the disputed territories for instance, and to hinder the
KRG’s independent oil policy. The two sides have agreed to make-up for now. It
could also lead to a new deal that would allow the Kurds to export through the
northern pipeline to Turkey again.
The Kurdish Coalition started boycotting the central
government in March 2013 over the new budget. It was passed when the list was not in parliament, and only included a few million for the compensation of oil
companies operating in Kurdistan, instead of the billions that it had
requested. The Kurds then withdrew their ministers and lawmakers in
protest. This caused divisions between the Kurdish parties with the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, the Change List, and the Kurdistan Islamic Union all
voicing their criticism of the decision, which was led by President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The central and regional
governments have been arguing over who has control over the country’s petroleum
policy for years. The Kurds believe they have the right to develop and export
oil on their own, while Baghdad demands that it have control. This has led to
the central government calling the KRG’s oil deals illegal, and a series of
short-term export deals, which constantly break down. That boiled over into the
2013 budget where Maliki refused to give into the Kurdish Coalition’s demands,
and caused their subsequent boycott.
The new agreement has been widely criticized by Kurdish
politicians and analysts. A member of the Kurdish Coalition said that he didn’t expect much from the new deal. Another Kurdish parliamentarian was quoted
as saying that this was just a way for Maliki to relieve some pressure on
himself, and that the KRG should have pushed Maliki to implement the 2010
agreement instead of coming up with a new one. In return for the Kurds’
support for the premier’s second term after the 2010 elections, Maliki agreed
to their 19-points, which included passage of the oil law, resolving the
disputed territories, amongst other issues. Tamim’s governor expressed
skepticism that Baghdad would follow through with the latest agreement, and
said that a deadline should have been given to the prime minister to implement
the deal, while the Change List’s public relations department stated that the negotiations
were only made to renew exports, and help out the oil companies in the region.
Finally, the head of the Iraqi Group for Strategic Studies told Reuters that he was sure that the new deal would breakdown as soon as Maliki felt like it. With so many questions regarding the relationship between Baghdad and Irbil it
raises the issue of why the Kurdish Coalition would go along with a new
agreement. The fact was the boycott was achieving nothing. The Kurdish list has
neither the ministers nor lawmakers to stop the government from doing its work.
Maliki for example, was going about his business, and even put the Kurdish
ministers on leave, and talked about naming their temporary replacements. The
whole point of the talks then was to find a face saving means for the Kurds to
return to the government.
Both the central and regional governments had reason to come
to terms. The Kurdish Coalition was looking for a way to go back to Baghdad
without appearing to have given in to the prime minister. Maliki on the other
hand, has been facing pressure from the Sunni protests, and wanted to take care
of the Kurdish dispute, so that he could focus upon the demonstrations. In the
short-term the Kurds may be able to officially export again if further talks
take place, but in the long-term this is just one of many agreements, which
will likely breakdown eventually. The differences between the two run deep, and
neither has been willing to hold any meaningful discussions about resolving
them. This is a shortcoming of the current political leadership, which sees
everything in zero sum terms, and is therefore unwilling to make any worthwhile
compromises as a result.
SOURCES
Ahmed, Hevidar, “Erbil-Baghdad
Meeting Eases Months of Explosive Tensions,” Rudaw, 5/7/13
Barznjy, Hiwa, “stay or go? iraq’s
kurdish MPs debate leaving govt. again,” Niqash, 4/4/13
Gharib, Sirwan, “Kurdish plan ignored as crisis continues,”
Niqash, 9/2/10
Al-Kadhimi, Mustafa, “KRG Prime
Minister Breaks Ice in Baghdad,” Al-Monitor, 5/2/13
Krohn, Jonathan, “Amid Crisis,
Erbil-Baghdad Talks Fail to Deliver,” Rudaw, 5/1/13
National Iraqi News Agency,
“Breaking News--- Maliki awards leave for Kurds’ ministers,” 4/7/13
- “Nechirvan Barzani: Kurdish
ministers, lawmakers ended their boycott to Cabinet, Parliament,” 5/1/13
Ninanews, “Kurdistan rules out withdrawal from Iraqi govt,
disagreement between KDP and PUK,” 3/11/13
Rasheed, Ahmed and Coles, Isabel,
“Iraq-Kurd oil talks break ice, long-term fix unlikely,” Reuters, 5/7/13
Shafaq News, “Kurdistan alliance
pessimistic from forming committees between Erbil and Baghdad,” 5/5/13
- “Kurdistan reveals Barzani –
Maliki seven-point agreement,” 5/4/13
Zebari, Abdel Hamid, “Iraq:
Shiite Delegation Seeks To Build Ties With Kurds,” Al-Monitor, 4/5/13
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